The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule by Editors,
ASIDE
THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS
OF THE INFIELD FLY RULE
The1 Infield Fly Rule 2 is neither a rule of law nor one of
equity; it is a rule of baseball.3 Since the4 1890's it has been a
part of the body of the official rules of baseball. 5 In its inquiry
11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 257-60 (1961).
2 OFF. R. BASEBALL 2.00 & 6.05(e). Rule 2.00 is definitional in nature and provides
that:
An INFIELD FLY is a fair fly ball (not including a line drive nor an at-
tempted bunt) which can be caught by an infielder with ordinary effort, when
first and second, or first, second and third bases are occupied, before two are
out. The pitcher, catcher, and any outfielder who stations himself in the infield
on the play shall be considered infielders for the purpose of this rule.
When it seems apparent that a batted ball will be an Infield Fly, the umpire
shall immediately declare "Infield Fly" for the benefit of the runners. If the ball
is near the baselines, the umpire shall declare "Infield Fly, if Fair."
The ball is alive and runners may advance at the risk of the ball being
caught, or retouch and advance after the ball is touched, the same as on any fly
ball. If the hit becomes a foul ball, it is treated the same as any foul.
NOTE: If a declared Infield Fly is allowed to fall untouched to the ground,
and bounces foul before passing first or third base, it is a foul ball. If a declared
Infield Fly falls untouched to the ground outside the baseline, and bounces fair
before passing first or third base, it is an Infield Fly.
Rule 6.05(e) gives operational effect to the definition, by providing that the batter is out
when an Infield Fly is declared.
Depending upon the circumstances, other rules which may or may not apply to a
particular situation include, inter alia, FED. R. Civ. P., Rule Against Perpetuities, and Rule
of Matthew 7:12 & Luke 6:31 (Golden).
' Although referred to as "Rules" both officially and in common parlance, if the
analogy between the conduct-governing strictures of baseball and a jurisprudential entity
on the order of a nation-state is to be maintained, the "rules" of baseball should be
considered to have the force, effect, and legitimacy of the statutes of a nation-state. The
analogy would continue to this end by giving the "ground rules" of a particular baseball
park the same status as the judge-made rules of procedure of a particular court.
I Note I supra.
5 It is only with the greatest hesitation that one hazards a guess as to the year of
origin of the Infield Fly Rule. Seymour considers it to have been 1893. 1 H. SEYIOUR,
BASEBALL 275 (1960). Richter, on the other hand, in an opinion which The Baseball
Encyclopedia joins, considers the rule to have entered the game in 1895. F. RICHTER,
RICHTER'S HISTORY AND RECORDS OF BASEBALL 256 (1914); THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA
1526-27 (1974). Finally, Voigt considers 1894 the correct year. 1 D. VOIGT, AMERICAN
BASEBALL 288 (1966).
Although independent investigation of primary sources has led to the belief that the
1474
INFIELD FLY RULE
into the common law origins6 of the rule, this Aside does not
seek to find a predecessor to the rule in seventeenth-century
England. The purpose of the Aside is rather to examine whether
the same types of forces that shaped the development of the
common law7 also generated the Infield Fly Rule.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to emphasize that
baseball is a game of English origin, rooted in the same soil from
which grew Anglo-American law and justice.8 In this respect it is
like American football and unlike basketball, a game that sprang
fully developed from the mind of James Naismith. 9 The story of
Abner. Doubleday, Cooperstown, and 1839, a pleasant tribute to
American ingenuity enshrined in baseball's Hall of Fame, is not
true.'0 The myth reflects a combination of economic oppor-
tunism," old friendship, 12 and not a small element of anti-
British feeling.13 The true birthplace of the game is England;
rule first developed in 1894 and 1895, notes 25-35 infra & accompanying text, a certain
sense of justice would be satisfied if the rule developed as a result of play during the
1894 season. For that season was the first of the championship seasons of the Baltimore
Orioles, the team that developed what is now known as "inside baseball," including such
plays as the Baltimore chop and the hit-and-run. The Orioles not only played smart
baseball; they played dirty baseball. "Although they may not have originated dirty
baseball they perfected it to a high degree. In a National League filled with dirty players
they were undoubtedly the dirtiest of their time and may have been the dirtiest the game
has ever known." D. WALLOP, BASEBALL: AN INFORMAL HISTORY 88 (1969); accord, L.
ALLEN, THE NATIONAL LEAGUE STORY 68 (1961); see R. SMITH, BASEBALL 136-46 (1947).
Even if the Infield Fly Rule was not developed as a result of the event of the 1894 season,
perhaps it should have been.
1 For a discussion of origins, see generally Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W.
363 (1927); Genesis 1:1-2:9. But see even more generally Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); R. ARDREY, AFRICAN GENESIS (1961); C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871); C.
DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
For a discussion of common law in a non-baseball context, see W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1903-1938); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
8 Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
9 R. BPASCH, How DID SPORTS BEGIN? 41 (1970).
10 R. HENDERSON, BAT, BALL AND BISHOP 170-94 (1947). The Doubleday theory of
origin is outlined in 84 CONG. REC. 1087-89 (1939) (remarks of Congressman Shanley)
(seinble). Congressional approval of the theory, however, was never forthcoming. H.R.J.
Res. 148, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), seeking to designate June 12, 1939, National
Baseball Day, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, never again to be heard
from. 84 CONG. REC. 1096 (1939). Nor did the Supreme Court formally adopt the
Doubleday theory. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-61 (1972) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(not explicitly rejecting the theory either). An interesting, if unlikely, explanation, offer-
able as an alternative to both the Doubleday and English theories of origin, is found in J.
HART, HEY! B.C. 26 from the back (unpaginated, abridged & undated ed.).
11 R. BRASCH, supra note 9, at 31-32.
12 R. HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 179. The chairman of the commission suggested
by A.G. Spalding to investigate the origins of the game was A.G. Mills, who had belonged
to the same military post as Abner Doubleday.
13 R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 31.
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thence it was carried to the western hemisphere, to develop as an
American form.
1 4
The original attitude toward baseball developed from dis-
tinctly English origins as well. The first "organized" games were
played in 1845 by the Knickerbocker Base Ball Club of New
York City, 15 and the rules which governed their contests clearly
indicate that the game was to be played by gentlemen. Winning
was not the objective; exercise was. 16 "The New York dub
players were 'gentlemen in the highest social sense'--that is, they
were rich .... The earliest clubs were really trying to transfer to
our unwilling soil a few of the seeds of the British cricket
spirit."'1 7 This spirit, which has been variously described as the
attitude of the amateur, of the gentleman, and of the sports-
man, 8 would have kept the rules simple and allowed moral
force to govern the game.19 Such an attitude, however, was un-
able to prevail.
As baseball grew, so did the influence of values that saw
winning, rather than exercise, as the purpose of the game.
2 0
Victory was to be pursued by any means possible within the
language of the rules, regardless of whether the tactic violated
the spirit of the rules.?' The written rules had to be made more
and more specific, in order to preserve the spirit of the game.
22
The Infield Fly Rule is obviously not a core principle of
baseball. Unlike the diamond itself or the concepts of "out" and
"safe," the Infield Fly Rule is not necessary to the game. Without
the Infield Fly Rule, baseball does not degenerate into
bladderbal 2 3 the way the collective bargaining process degener-
1 See generally H. SEYMOUR, supra note 5; D. VOIGT, supra note 5. The American
qualities of the game are also revealed in other than historical or legal contexts. Cf. M.
GARDNER, THE ANNOTATED CASEY AT THE BAT (1967); B. MALAMUD, THE NATURAL
(1952).
15 R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 32-35.
16 KNICKERBOCKER BASE BALL CLUB R. 1 (1845), reprinted in R. HENDERSON, supra
note 10, at 163-64, and in F. RICHTER, supra note 5, at 227.
17 R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 37.
18 Keating, Sportsmanship as a Moral Category, 75 ETHicS 25, 33 (1964).
19 R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 68-69.
20 1 D. VOIGHT, supra note 5, at xvii; cf. Hearings on S. 3445, Federal Sports Act of 1972,
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95 (1973) (statement of H.
Cosell). See generally Keating, supra note 18, at 31-34.
21 Perhaps the most glaring example of this attitude is contained in the career of
Mike "King" Kelly. When the rules permitted substitutions on mere notice to the umpire,
Kelly inserted himself into the game after the ball was hit in order to catch a ball out of
reach of any of his teammates. R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 89-90.
22 Cf. id. 68-69; 1 D. VOIGT, supra note 5, at 204-05.
23 See Yale Daily News, Oct. 29, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
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ates into economic warfare when good faith is absent. 24 It is a
technical rule, a legislative response to actions that were previ-
ously permissible, though contrary to the spirit of the sport.
Whether because the men who oversaw the rules of baseball
during the 1890's were unwilling to make a more radical change
than was necessary to remedy a perceived problem in the game,
or because they were unable to perceive the need for a broader
change than was actually made, three changes in the substantive
rules, stretching over a seven-year period, were required to put
the Infield Fly Rule in its present form. In each legislative re-
sponse to playing field conduct, however, the fundamental mo-
tive for action remained the same: "To prevent the defense from
making a double play by subterfuge, at a time when the offense
is helpless to prevent it, rather than by skill and speed.12 5
The need to enforce this policy with legislation first became
apparent in the summer of 1893. In a game between New York
and Baltimore, with a fast runner on first, a batter with the
"speed of an ice wagon ' 26 hit a pop fly. The runner stayed on
first, expecting the ball to be caught. The fielder, however, let
the ball drop to the ground, and made the force out at second.
The particular occurrence did not result in a double play, but
that possibility was apparent; it would require only that the ball
not be hit as high. Although even the Baltimore Sun credited the
New York Giant with "excellent judgment,"28 the incident sug-
gested that something should be done, because by the play the
defense obtained an advantage that it did not deserve and that
the offense could not have prevented. Umpires could handle the
situation by calling the batter out,29 but this was not a satisfactory
solution; it could create as many problems as it solved.30 The
1894 winter meeting responded with adoption of the "trap ball"
24 NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1960).
25 1 H. SEYMOUR, supra note 5, at 276.
26 Baltimore Sun, May 24, 1893, at 6, col. 2. Raised by this statement is the issue of
the speed of an ice wagon in both relative and absolute terms. Such inquiry is beyond the
scope of this Aside.
27 Id. The fielder who made the play was Giant shortstop and captain John Mont-
gomery Ward, who became a successful attorney after his playing days ended. 1 D.
VoIGT, supra note 5, at 285.
28 Baltimore Sun, May 24, 1893, at 6, col. 2.
29E.g., the Chicago-Baltimore game of June 8, 1893. "In the second inning .. .
Kelley hit a pop fly to short-stop. Dahlen caught the ball, then dropped it and threw to
second base, a runner being on first. The muff was so plain that Umpire McLaughlin
refused to allow the play and simply called the batsman out." Baltimore Sun, June 9,
1893, at 6, col. 2.
3' Text accompanying notes 45-46 infra.
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rule, putting the batter out if he hit a ball that could be handled
by an infielder while first base was occupied with one out.31
The trap ball rule of 1894, however, did not solve all prob-
lems. First, although the rule declared the batter out, there was
no way to know that the rule was in effect for a particular play.
The umpire was not required to make his decision until after the
play, and, consequently, unnecessary disputes ensued.3 2 Second,
it became apparent that the feared unjust double play was not
one involving the batter and one runner, but one that, when two
men were on base, would see two baserunners declared out.33
The 1895 league meeting ironed out these difficulties through
changes in the rules. 34 The third problem with the trap ball rule
of 1894, one not perceived until later, was that it applied only
when one man was out. The danger of an unfair double play,
however, also exists when there are no men out. This situation
was corrected in 1901, and the rule has remained relatively un-
changed since that time.
35
The Infield Fly Rule, then, emerged from the interplay of
four factors, each of which closely resembles a major force in the
development of the common law. First is the sporting approach
to baseball. A gentleman, when playing a game, does not act in a
manner so unexpected as to constitute trickery;3 6 in particular
he does not attempt to profit by his own unethical conduct.
37
31 Baltimore Sun, Feb. 27, 1894, at 6, col. 3. The rule stated that "the batsman is out
if he hits a fly ball that can be handled by an infielder while first base is occupied and
with only one out." Id. Apr. 26, 1894, at 6, col. 2.
32 Baltimore Sun, Apr. 26, 1894, at 6n col. 2.
33 1 H. SEYMOUR, supra note 5, at 275-76. Seymour developed yet another reason for
the change in the rule: that "teams got around it by having outfielders come in fast and
handle the pop fly." Id. 276. This does not appear to be a valid thesis because, from the
beginning, the rule referred not to whether an infielder, as opposed to an outfielder, did
handle the chance, but to whether an infielder could handle it. Note 31 supra.
34 Baltimore Sun, Feb. 18, 1895, at 6, col. 4. Id. Feb. 28, 1895, at 6, col. 5.
31 THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1527 (1974). The current rule is set forth in note 2
supra.
3' See, e.g., Pluck (the wonder chicken).
37 In the law, this belief is reflected in the clean hands doctrine, which "is rooted in
the historical concept of [the] court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the
requirements of conscience and good faith." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automo-
tive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945). For a statutory codification of the
clean hands rule, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 28548, 2 (West 1967) (requiring
food service employees to "clean hands" before leaving restroom). See generally Z. CHAFEE,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, chs. 1-3 (1950).
To be contrasted with the doctrine of "clean hands" is the "sticky fingers" doctrine.
The latter embodies the reaction of the baseball world to the excitement caused by the
emergence of the home run as a major aspect of the game. Applying to the ball a foreign
substance, such as saliva, made the big hit a difficult feat to achieve. As a result, in 1920,
the spitball was outlawed. L. ALLEN, Supra note 5, at 167. The banning of the spitball was
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The gentleman's code provides the moral basis for the rule; it is
the focal point of the rule, just as the more general precept of
fair play provides a unifying force to the conduct of the game.
The principle of Anglo-American law analogous to this gen-
tleman's concept of fair play is the equally amorphous concept of
due process, or justice38 itself.
Baseball's society, like general human society, includes more
than gentlemen, and the forces of competitiveness and profes-
sionalism required that the moral principle of fair play be
codified so that those who did not subscribe to the principle
would nonetheless be required to abide by it.39 Thus the second
factor in the development of the Infield Fly Rule-a formal and
legalistic code of rules ensuring proper conduct-was created.
40
In the common law, this development manifested itself in the
formalism of the writ system.41 Conduct was governed by gen-
eral principles; but to enforce a rule of conduct, it was necessary
to find a remedy in a specific writ.42 The common law plaintiff
had no remedy if the existing writs did not encompass the wrong
complained of; and the baseball player who had been the victim
of a "cute" play could not prevail until the umpire could be
shown a rule of baseball squarely on point.
To the generalization set forth in the preceding sentence
there is an exception, both at common law and at baseball. At
common law, the exception was equity, which was able to aid the
plaintiff who could not find a form of action at law. 43 At
baseball, the exception was the power of the umpire to make a
not, however, absolute. Seventeen pitchers were given lifetime waivers of the ban, id..
possibly because the spitball had become an essential element of their stock-in-trade, and
depriving them of the pitch would in effect deny them the right to earn a living. See
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 F. Supp. 855, 857
(W.D. Wash. 1933); Winther v. Village of Weippe, 91 Idaho 798, 803-04, 430 P.2d 689,
694-95 (1967); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973). But see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963).
'8 See generally, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV and cases citing thereto; Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971); Bentley,John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1070 (1973);
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1020
(1973); cf, e.g., Byron R. "Whizzer" White (1962-), Hugo L. Black (1937-71), & Horace
Gray (1881-1902) (Justices). But cf., e.g., Roger B. Taney (1836-64) (Chief Justice).
39 Keating, supra note 18, at 30. See also R. SMITH, supra note 5, at 68-69.
40 Text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
41 2 F. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 477-83 (1911).
42 F. POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW 13 (1912); 2 F. POLLOCK, & F.
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 558-65 (2d ed. 1952).
43 F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 4-5 (1909).
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call that did not fit within a particular rule. 44 The powers of
equity and of the umpire, however, were not unlimited. The law
courts circumscribed the power of the chancellor to the great-
est extent possible, and this process of limitation has been
defended.45 Likewise, the discretionary power of the umpire has
been limited: Additions to the written rules have reduced the
area within which the umpire has discretion to act. Strong policy
reasons favor this limitation upon the umpire's discretionary
power. Because finality of decision is as important as correctness
of decision, an action that invites appeal, as broad discretion in
the umpire does, is not valued. The umpire must have the status
of an unchallengeable finder of fact.46 Allowing challenges to his
authority on matters of rules admits the possibility that he may
be wrong, and encourages a new generation of challenges to
findings of fact.
The fourth element in the development of the Infield Fly
Rule is demonstrated by the piecemeal approach that rules
committees took to the problem. They responded to problems as
they arose; the process of creating the Infield Fly Rule was in-
cremental, with each step in the development of the rule merely
a refinement of the previous step. Formalism was altered to the
extent necessary to achieve justice in the particular case; it was
not abandoned and replaced with a new formalism. Anglo-
American law has two analogies to this process. The first is the
way in which common law precedents are employed to mold
existing remedies to new situations. Although the rigid structure
of the common law was slow to change, it did change. The sub-
stantive change took place not only as a result of judicial deci-
sion; it was also caused by legislation, which is the second anal-
ogy. The legislation, however, was to a great extent directed at
specific defects perceived to exist in the system. 47 Adjustment of
the law, not its reform, was the goal of the legislative process.
The rules of baseball and of Anglo-American jurisprudence are
thus to be contrasted with the continental system of complete
codes designed to remedy society's ills with a single stroke of the
legislative brush.48
The dynamics of the common law and the development of
one of the most important technical rules of baseball, although
11 Note 29 supra.
15 2 F. MAITLAND, supra note 41, at 491-94.
46 OFF. R. BASEBALL 4.19.
47 F. POLLOCK, supra note 42, at 72.
48 Cf. H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAw 77-78 (2d ed. 1949).
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on the surface completely different in outlook and philosophy,
share significant elements. Both have been essentially conserva-
tive, changing only as often as a need for change is perceived,
and then only to the extent necessary to remove the need for
further change. Although problems are solved very slowly when
this attitude prevails, the solutions that are adopted do not
create many new difficulties. If the process reaps few rewards, it
also runs few risks.
